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Abstract: This paper studies whether people can avoid punishment by 
remaining willfully ignorant about possible negative consequences of their 
actions for others. We employ a laboratory experiment, using modified 
dictator games in which a dictator can remain willfully ignorant about the 
payoff consequences of his decision for a receiver. A third party can 
punish the dictator after observing the dictator’s decision and the resulting 
payoffs. On the one hand, willfully ignorant dictators are punished less if 
their actions lead to unfair outcomes than dictators who reveal the 
consequences before implementing the same outcome. On the other hand, 
willfully ignorant dictators are punished more than revealing dictators if 
their actions do not lead to unfair outcomes. We conclude that willful 
ignorance can circumvent blame when unfair outcomes result, but that the 
act of remaining willfully ignorant is itself punished, regardless of the 
outcome. 
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“A man is responsible for his ignorance.” – Milan Kundera, Laughable Loves 
 
1. Introduction  
Many important decisions involve tradeoffs between personal benefits and impacts on the welfare 
of others. In such situations, there is often the possibility of remaining uninformed about how 
one’s actions affect others. Such “willful ignorance” may provide a justification for self-
interested behavior – after all, how can one be faulted for taking an action that one believes 
creates no harm for others? Thus, while a decision maker is typically held responsible for 
knowingly committing an action that hurts others, the attribution of responsibility is less clear 
when he acts without knowledge of consequences. Such reasoning may even hold when the 
decision to remain ignorant is made privately, as ignorance allows one to act selfishly without 
direct confrontation with the consequences for others or the associated guilt (Dana, Weber, and 
Kuang, 2007). Thus, strategically manipulating one’s information about the consequences of 
one’s actions for others provides a path through which ignorance, even when deliberate, might 
provide insulation from responsibility or blame.  
In law, ignorance is not recognized as an excuse, as the legal principle “ignorantia juris 
non excusat” demonstrates. For example, when driving 65 mph, ignorance that the speed limit is 
50 mph, fails to provide legal exculpation. Nevertheless, in corporate and political contexts, 
individuals often present ignorance as an excuse for why they should not be held responsible for 
adverse outcomes that they caused. For example, following corporate scandals and fraud, CEOs 
and board members often excuse their role by claiming they were not aware of what took place 
further down the hierarchy. Examples include former Enron CEO Kenneth Lay, who claimed 
ignorance about any accounting irregularities at the failed firm, and Rupert Murdoch, who was 
directly accused of showing “willful blindness” concerning the phone-hacking practices at News 
Corporation.2 Following the 2008 financial crisis, many individuals and institutions involved in 
the sale of deceptively valued and marketed investment products deflected responsibility with the 
claim that these products were too difficult to understand.3 In the political sphere, public officials 
2 See http://www.businessweek.com/stories/2006-02-05/commentary-ken-lays-audacious-ignorance  and 
http://www.guardian.co.uk/media/2012/may/01/phone-hacking-report-wilful-blindness 
3 See http://www.nytimes.com/2009/03/12/business/12crime.html?pagewanted=1&_r=1&th&emc=th 
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sometimes argue that being unaware of acts that were committed in an administration should 
exonerate them from blame.4  
Prior research in economics has demonstrated that decision makers seize upon strategies 
to act self-interestedly at the expense of others, when presented with opportunities for avoiding 
blame or responsibility.5 An important but largely open question, however, is to what extent such 
strategies are, in fact, effective in deflecting blame.6  
Our study directly addresses this issue, by attempting to quantify the extent to which 
engaging in willful ignorance allows a decision maker to deflect external blame for his actions 
and their consequences. To this end, we conduct a laboratory experiment in which some 
participants can choose to remain ignorant about the consequences of their actions on others and 
in which other participants have the opportunity to impose costly monetary punishments after 
observing behavior and the resulting outcomes. We interpret the assigned punishment points as a 
measure of blame and responsibility attribution for an action and its consequences.  
More precisely, in our experiment a dictator plays a binary dictator game under one of 
two possible states of the world. The state of the world is chosen by a random device and 
determines whether an action that is personally beneficial for the dictator benefits or harms the 
receiver. The dictator can decide whether or not to learn the true state, and faces no cost for 
acquiring this information. The realized state is irrelevant for the dictator’s payoffs, meaning that 
ignorance creates no uncertainty about the dictator’s payoffs, but enables the dictator to remain 
ignorant about the effects of his action on others. Thus, our design affords the dictator the 
opportunity to remain willfully ignorant regarding the consequences of his actions for others. 
Our focus is not on the effects of willful ignorance per se, however (cf. Dana, et al., 
2007), but instead on the extent to which remaining willfully ignorant allows the dictator to avoid 
blame and responsibility when a bad outcome results for the recipient. Therefore, in our 
4 In fact, political science has long recognized the ability to avoid blame as an important determinant of a politician’s 
success (Weaver, 1986) and ignorance as a potential strategy to do so (McGraw, 1991). 
5 Some research demonstrates that decision makers hide behind uncertainty – both their own and that of others – 
about what outcomes will result or how such outcomes were produced in order to keep more money in a 
distributional context (Dana et al., 2007; Andreoni and Bernheim, 2009; Ockenfels and Werner, 2012). In some 
cases, this can even mean that people are willing to accept less money in order to forgo the opportunity to share – 
and have the other person know that sharing could have taken place  (Broberg, Ellingsen, and Johannesson 2007; 
Dana, Cain, and Dawes 2006; Lazear, Malmendier, and Weber 2012). Hamman, Loewenstein, and Weber (2010) 
show that delegating distributive decisions to others similarly provides a justification for self-interested behavior.  
6 Research into the effectiveness of blame-avoidance strategies has only recently started to gain traction. For 
example, Bartling and Fischbacher (2012) show experimentally that delegating a decision that leads to an unfair 
allocation is an effective way to shift blame from oneself toward the person to whom the decision is delegated. 
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experiment a third party observes the actions of the dictator and the outcome of the game and 
decides whether and to what extent to punish the dictator for his behavior.  
Our results show that, when outcomes detrimental to the recipient result, ignorance is 
indeed effective in reducing punishment. That is, when taking an action that increases one’s own 
welfare, but also results in harm to others, it is better to have avoided knowledge that harm would 
occur. Thus, ignorance can help avoid blame.  
At the same time, however, we find that willful ignorance itself is evaluated negatively, 
regardless of the consequences. That is, choosing to forgo information concerning the recipient’s 
payoffs and acting in a self-regarding way incites punishment, even when the resulting state of 
the world is one in which the dictator’s self-interest is also beneficial for the recipient. Thus, the 
mere act of avoiding information about how one’s decisions affect others provokes blame and 
punishment.  
As a result of the above two counteracting effects of ignorance on punishment by third 
parties, in expectation, willful ignorance does not yield a higher payoff than knowingly acting 
selfishly. That is, while ignorance provides some blame avoidance when bad outcomes result, the 
fact that its use produces blame even when the outcomes are good makes it an ineffective strategy 
for obtaining higher payoffs. 
However, the punishment pattern that is revealed in our study has important implications 
for how willful ignorance might interact with punishment outside the laboratory. Attention to the 
possibility of blame and punishment is often salient only when bad outcomes arise – e.g., 
following a scandal or harmful misdeed. The fact that decision makers are penalized less when 
acting under willful ignorance therefore suggests that willful ignorance may be a good strategy in 
contexts where punishment is unlikely to be considered absent some noticeably bad consequence. 
Thus, corporate and political leaders who suspect wrongdoing in the institutions they manage 
may, indeed, benefit from a strategy involving willful ignorance. 
Our results are also important for economic theories of social preferences. We find 
significant differences in punishment for the same outcome, depending on whether the dictator 
revealed the state before making his choice. This cannot be explained by theories that incorporate 
social motives through preferences over final payoff distributions (Fehr and Schmidt 1999; 
Bolton and Ockenfels 2000), which predict the same punishment for an allocation, independently 
of the actions that led to the allocation. The qualitative comparative-static effect of willful 
ignorance on punishment is consistent with theories that incorporate intention-based reciprocity 
3 
 
as a motive (Rabin 1993; Dufwenberg and Kirchsteiger 2004; Falk and Fischbacher 2006; Sebald 
2010). However, these models fail to predict our additional finding that willfully ignorant 
dictators are still punished less when the beneficial outcome occurs than when the unfair outcome 
obtains. That is, outcomes matter even for willfully ignorant dictators. 
Research on procedural fairness recognizes that people care not only about distributions 
of final outcomes, but also about the procedures employed to implement outcomes (Frey, Benz, 
and Stutzer 2004; Bolton, Brandts, and Ockenfels 2005; Trautmann 2009; Krawczyk 2011; 
Fudenberg and Levine 2012). Our study contributes to this literature in that we show that 
punishment is not determined solely by consequences, but also by the process – the dictator’s 
decision whether to acquire information – that leads to those consequences. Our research 
therefore also relates to other recent studies that find both ex ante fairness (equal opportunities, 
fair procedures) and ex post fairness (equal payoffs) to influence redistributive choices (Brock, 
Lange, and Ozbay 2013; Cappelen et al., 2013). We find that a simple model combining ex ante 
and ex post fairness, like the one suggested in Brock et al. (2013), is able to predict both the 
qualitative comparative-static effect of willful ignorance on the assigned punishment and the 
finding that punishment depends on consequences following willful ignorance.  
There exists prior evidence that willful ignorance can be used to obtain more favorable 
wealth distributions, in the context of bilateral bargaining. Building on earlier experiments on 
bilateral bargaining with incomplete information about values, which demonstrated that more 
informed parties extract more favorable payoffs (Roth and Murnighan 1982), Kagel, Kim, and 
Moser (1996) show that responders in an ultimatum game are willing to accept very unequal 
monetary payoffs more often when the proposer is only partly informed about the receiver’s 
payoffs than when the proposer has complete information. Thus, a party that is ignorant about the 
consequences of an offer for the other party can make less favorable offers. Conrads and 
Irlenbusch (2013) confirm that this applies to willful ignorance: offers to another party by a 
proposer in an ultimatum bargaining game who chooses to be ignorant are accepted more 
frequently than comparable offers by a fully informed proposer.  
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes our experimental 
design. Section 3 summarizes our results with respect to the observed punishment pattern and the 
dictator’s decisions. Section 4 discusses the predictions of different social preference models 
regarding the qualitative comparative-static effect of willful ignorance on punishment behavior. 
Finally, Section 5 concludes the paper. 
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2. Experimental Design 
Our study uses one-shot binary dictator games that are modified to allow for willful ignorance 
and punishment. In the modified games, there are three players, as well as a move by nature that 
determines payoffs. Nature moves first, implementing one of two payoff states, ω1 or ω2, with 
equal probabilities, i.e., p(ω1) = p(ω2) = 0.5.  
The state determines the relationship between a dictator’s choices and the payoffs of a 
passive recipient, as depicted in Figure 1. More precisely, a dictator chooses between two 
options, a1 and a2. Regardless of the state, the dictator receives a payoff of 70 for choosing a1 
and 50 for choosing a2. However, in ω1, the recipient receives 10 for the dictator’s choice of a1 
and 50 for a choice of a2. In ω2 the recipient’s payoffs are reversed: 50 for a choice of a1 and 10 
for a2. 
Depending on the treatment, the dictator is either informed about the realized state or not. 
In a hidden information treatment, he is not initially informed, but he can choose whether to find 
out the state at no cost or remain willfully ignorant. The dictator then chooses between a1 and a2, 
either with or without knowledge of the state.  
Finally, a third party can inflict punishment upon the dictator, after observing the 
dictator’s choice, the realized state, and the resulting payoffs. Our primary interest is in these 
punishment decisions. 
 
 Figure 1: The dictator’s choice options in state ω1 and state ω1. The dictator’s monetary 
payoff is shown in the top row, the receiver’s payoff in the bottom row. 
 
Figure 1 also presents labels that provide an interpretation of the dictator’s actions and 
their consequences, conditional on the realization of a particular state. In state ω1, a choice of a1 
5 
 
leads to an unfair allocation in that the dictator receives the highest possible payoff and the 
recipient the lowest one. Conversely, a choice of a2 in state ω1 leads to a fair allocation. Thus, in 
ω1 there is a conflict between what is best for the dictator and for the recipient, as in standard 
dictator games. However, this conflict is entirely removed in state ω2. Here a choice of a1 is 
dominant for a dictator who cares both about her own payoff and that of the recipient, while a2 
leads to a dominated allocation of 50-10.7 A conflict of interest thus exists in ω1, but the 
dictator’s and the receiver’s payoffs are aligned in ω2. 
The third party has an endowment of 50 and can reduce the dictator’s payoff after 
observing the dictator’s allocation choice and the state of the world. Punishment is costly for the 
third party. For each unit of punishment allocated by the third party, the dictator’s payoff 
decreases by 5 and the third party’s payoff by 1. Punishment is constrained in that the dictator’s 
payoff cannot be reduced below 10. Thus, for example, if the dictator’s payoff is 70 before 
punishment, the third party can allocate any integer amount between 0 and 12 as punishment, to 
deduct up to 60 from the dictator’s payoff. If the dictator’s payoff is 50, the maximum 
punishment is 8 units, which decreases the dictator’s payoff by 40.  
Final payoffs are as follows. The dictator receives 70 or 50, depending on her choice of a1 
or a2, minus five times the punishment points assigned by the third party. The receiver gets either 
50 or 10, depending on the dictator’s decision and the relevant state. The third party’s payoff is 
50 minus the units of punishment allocated to reduce the dictator’s payoff.  
We implemented two treatment variations that differ only with respect to the information 
that the dictator possesses regarding the state.  
 
2.1 Baseline treatment 
In the baseline treatment, it is common knowledge that the dictator is informed about the state of 
the world before he makes his decision between a1 and a2. Thus, the dictator is fully aware of 
whether the choice is between the unfair and fair allocations or the dominant and dominated 
ones. To elicit dictator’s complete strategies, we implemented the strategy method. That is, we 
asked each dictator how he would decide if state ω1 were realized and how he would decide if 
state ω2 were realized. Only after the dictator made both choices, he learned the actual realized 
state, and he knew that his choice in this state would be binding. 
7 We use the labels “fair,” “unfair,” etc. for expositional reasons in the paper. In the experimental instructions, the 
dictator’s choice options were neutrally framed as “Option 1” and “Option 2.” 
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The third party was informed (i) about the state of the world and (ii) the dictator’s choice 
in this realized state, and could then assign punishment points to decrease the dictator’s payoff. 
We also applied the strategy method to elicit the punishment choices. That is, we asked the third 
party to indicate how many points she would deduct from the dictator’s payoff for both possible 
choices by the dictator in both possible states of the world. Only after the third party made her 
decisions in all four possible cases, she learned the state of the world and the dictator’s decision 
in this state. The third party knew that the chosen amount of punishment in the relevant case 
would be binding. 
 
2.2 Hidden information treatment  
In the hidden information treatment, it is common knowledge that the dictator is initially 
uninformed about the state of the world. Importantly, this uncertainty does not apply to the 
dictator’s own payoffs, which are identical in both states. A choice of a1 gives the dictator 70, 
while a2 gives the dictator 50. Uncertainty only applies to the consequences of the two choices 
for the receiver’s payoffs, as described in Figure 1. The dictator has the option to reveal the state 
before making his allocation decision. Following Dana et al. (2007), ignorance is the default, but 
revealing is costless and implemented by clicking a button on the decision screen.  
If the dictator remains ignorant, his choice is between a payoff of 70 or 50 for himself. In 
this case, the dictator will never be informed about the underlying state of the world and he will 
thus never learn the receiver’s payoff – i.e., whether the receiver got a payoff of 50 or 10. 
However, if the dictator reveals, he essentially places himself in the baseline condition. That is, 
he learns the state of the world and chooses either between the unfair and fair allocation in state 
ω1, or between the dominant and dominated allocation in state ω2.  
As with the baseline treatment, we implemented the strategy method to elicit the 
allocation choices, where possible. That is, dictators first decided whether they wanted to acquire 
the payoff information or remain ignorant. If a dictator chose to remain ignorant, then he made a 
choice between a1 and a2, while if the dictator chose to acquire the payoff information, he then 
indicated choices of a1 or a2 for each of the two possible realized states. Only after the dictator 
made both choices, he learned the state of the world, and he knew that his choice in this state 
would be binding.  
The third party was informed of (i) whether or not the dictator revealed the state, (ii) the 
realized state of the world, and (iii) what choice the dictator made, either in ignorance or 
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conditional on the realized state. The third party thus knew the state of the world even if the 
dictator chose to remain ignorant. The third party then decided how many punishment units to 
apply to the dictator’s payoff. We again used the strategy method to elicit the punishment 
decisions by third parties for all possible states and actions by the dictator. Note that there are 
now eight possible cases, as all four possible allocations can result either after remaining ignorant 
or after revealing. 
 
2.3 General procedures 
Before the subjects entered the lab, they randomly drew a place card that specified at which 
computer terminal to sit. The terminal number determined both a subject’s role and the group 
matching. After entering the lab, subjects found paper copies of the instructions at their assigned 
computer terminals. One third of the subjects read in the instructions that they were to be in the 
role of the dictator (neutrally labeled as “player A”). Two thirds of the subjects learned that they 
would be either in the role of the receiver (“player B”) or in the role of the third party (“player 
C”). Subjects in these two roles both made choices as third parties; they learned of their actual 
roles only afterward. If they were assigned the role of the third party, then the chosen amount of 
punishment in the relevant case would be binding for their group. If they were assigned to the 
role of receiver, their decisions would have no impact on the group, as receivers made no 
decision in the game. This procedure enabled us to elicit punishment decisions, which are the 
focus of this paper, from two thirds of our subjects.  
We conducted four sessions of the baseline treatment with 81 subjects in total (27 subjects 
in the role of the dictator and 54 subjects in the role of the receiver/third party). We also 
conducted four sessions of the hidden information treatment with 90 subjects in total (30 subjects 
in the role of the dictator and 60 subjects in the role of the receiver/third party).  
All sessions took place at the decision laboratory of the Department of Economics at the 
University of Zurich in June 2012. The experiments were computerized with the software “z-
Tree” (Fischbacher, 2007) and the recruitment was conducted with the software “ORSEE” 
(Greiner, 2003). Subjects were students from the University of Zurich and the Swiss Federal 
Institute of Technology (ETH) in Zurich. Students majoring in economics or psychology were 
not eligible to participate. Each subject participated in only one treatment. Subjects’ instructions 
included comprehension questions that had to be answered correctly before the experiment could 
begin. A summary of the instructions was read aloud to ensure common knowledge of the 
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instructions. An English translation of the original German instructions for the hidden 
information treatment can be found in Appendix B. Baseline sessions lasted about 50 minutes, 
sessions with hidden information about 60 minutes. Payoffs from the game, denominated in 
“points” were converted into money at the rate of 2 points to CHF 1 (about $1 at the time of the 
experiment) at the end of the experiment. On average, subjects earned CHF 39.80 in the baseline 
sessions and CHF 41.30 in the hidden information sessions. These amounts include a show-up 
fee of CHF 15. The subjects received their payments privately to ensure the anonymity of the 
decisions taken during the experiment.  
 
3. Results 
3.1 Punishment Pattern 
The focus of this paper is the pattern of third-party punishment for dictator allocation choices. 
Our particular interest is in studying how the dictator’s choice to either remain ignorant or 
become informed about the receiver’s payoffs influences punishment. 
Figure 2 shows the average punishment that was assigned to the dictator for the different 
realized allocations in the baseline and in the hidden information treatment. The exact values can 
be read from Table 1. For instance, the left black bar in Figure 2 shows that the dictator is 
punished 19.72 points, on average, if he chooses the unfair allocation in state ω1 in the baseline 
treatment.  
In accordance with prior findings on third-party punishment (e.g., Fehr and Fischbacher 
2004), the figure shows that the dictators are punished significantly more for knowingly 
implementing the unfair allocation than for the fair allocation. This holds true in the baseline and 
when the dictator chose to acquire the information in the hidden information treatment. When 
dictators remained ignorant, the difference in punishment for implementing the unfair vs. fair 
allocation was smaller, but also statistically significant. Thus, regardless of the dictator’s 
knowledge or (willful) ignorance of the consequence to the receiver, a choice that results in an 
unfair allocation is punished more relative to one that results in a fair one (p<0.01 in all three 
comparisons, using a Wilcoxon signed rank test).8  
 
8 All tests reported in this paper are two-sided. 
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Our data show, however, that willful ignorance mitigates the punishment received by a 
dictator whose actions result in the unfair allocation. A willfully ignorant dictator who chooses 
70 points for himself is punished significantly less if the unfair allocation realizes (11.42) 
compared to a dictator who directly chooses the unfair allocation when the consequences are 
known – i.e., after revealing (16.25) or in the baseline treatment (19.72) (Wilcoxon signed rank 
test, p<0.01, and Wilcoxon rank-sum test, p=0.014, respectively). Thus, our experiment reveals 
that willful ignorance can mitigate some of the blame and punishment received when knowingly 
implementing unfair outcomes. 
 
Result 1: Willfully ignorant dictators are punished less for implementing an unfair 
outcome compared to dictators who knowingly chose the same outcome. 
 
However, the opposite pattern emerges when one considers what happens in cases where 
the resulting allocation is the dominant one, which is favorable to both the dictator and the 
receiver.  Here, willfully ignorant dictators are punished significantly more (8.00) compared with 
dictators who choose the dominant allocation after revealing (2.76) or in the baseline treatment 
(1.76) (Wilcoxon signed rank test, p=0.034, and Wilcoxon rank-sum test p=0.039, respectively). 
Thus, willful ignorance itself appears to receive blame and punishment, even when it results in an 
outcome favorable to everyone.  
0
4
8
12
16
20
24
unfair
70-10
fair
50-50
dominant
70-50
dominated
50-10
State 1 State 2
Baseline Hidden Info - Revealed Hidden Info - Ignorant
Figure 2: Average Punishment of the Dictator by the Third Party. 
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Result 2: Willfully ignorant dictators are punished more for implementing a 
dominant outcome compared to dictators who knowingly chose the same outcome. 
Willful ignorance is thus inherently blameworthy. 
 
Due to this opposing effect of willful ignorance on punishment, the difference in 
punishment between the unfair and the dominant allocation is much smaller when the dictator 
remained ignorant than when he revealed the state in the hidden information treatment or in the 
baseline treatment (3.42 vs. 13.58 and 17.96, respectively). Nevertheless, this difference is still 
highly significant (Wilcoxon signed rank tests, p<0.01 in all three cases).  
 
Result 3: Dictators, including willfully ignorant ones, are punished more if an 
unfair outcome obtains than if a dominant outcome obtains. Outcomes thus matter 
for punishment even under willful ignorance. 
 
We observe a similar pattern when a dictator chooses 50 for himself. In accordance with 
Result 1, if the choice is made under willful ignorance and the dominated allocation realizes, the 
dictator is punished significantly less (6.00) compared to a dictator who chooses dominated after 
revealing (9.50) or in the baseline treatment (12.41) (Wilcoxon signed rank test, p=0.029 and 
Wilcoxon rank-sum test, p=0.011, respectively). However, the willfully ignorant dictator is 
punished significantly more if the fair allocation realizes (4.42) compared to a dictator who 
chooses fair after revealing (0.58) or in the baseline treatment (0.56) (Wilcoxon signed rank test, 
p<0.01, and Wilcoxon rank-sum test, p<0.01, respectively).9 This finding confirms Result 2. The 
difference in punishment between the fair and the dominated allocation is again much smaller 
when the dictator remained ignorant than when he revealed the state in the hidden information 
treatment or in the baseline treatment (1.59 vs. 8.92 and 11.85, respectively). This difference is at 
least marginally significant in all three cases (Wilcoxon signed rank tests, p=0.052, p<0.01 and 
p<0.01, respectively), which is consistent with Result 3. 
To summarize, we find a consistent comparative-static effect of willful ignorance on 
punishment. On the one hand, whenever an allocation results in which the receiver receives the 
low payoff of 10, the dictator is punished significantly less when he remained ignorant than when 
he had the payoff information (Result 1). On the other hand, for allocations that are beneficial to 
9 As we report below, willfully ignorant dictators never chose 50 points for themselves. Also, none of the dictators 
who revealed chose dominated in state ω2. In the baseline treatment, only one dictator chose dominated. 
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the receiver – i.e., when the receiver gets the high payoff of 50 – the dictator is punished 
significantly more when he remained ignorant (Result 2). Willful ignorance thus deflects blame 
and punishment for socially “bad” outcomes (the unfair or the dominated allocation). The fact 
that the dictator did not know for sure that the receiver would get a low payoff appears to serve as 
an acceptable excuse, to some extent. At the same time, willful ignorance is regarded as 
blameworthy in itself. A willfully ignorant dictator is punished significantly more than a dictator 
who reveals or a dictator in the baseline treatment when the receiver experiences no harm (in 
either the fair or the dominant allocation). Remaining ignorant means that the dictator risks the 
possibility of the receiver obtaining a low payoff, and this appears sufficient for inducing 
punishment by third parties. Finally, we observe that outcomes matter (Result 3). Dictators 
always receive more punishment when their actions yield the disadvantageous outcome for the 
receiver, regardless of the information possessed or acquired by the dictator. 
 
Table 1: Average Punishment and Frequency of Punishment  
 
Finally, we do not find that revealing the state is treated differently from exogenously 
knowing the state. A comparison of the punishment for a dictator who reveals in the hidden 
information treatment with the punishment in the baseline treatment, where the dictator knows 
the state of the world by default, reveals no significant differences (Wilcoxon rank-sum tests, 
p=0.331, p=0.743, p=0.900, and p=0.196, for unfair, fair, dominant, and dominated, 
respectively).  
A similar pattern to the one that we observe in punishment levels also emerges when we 
look at the comparative-static effect of willful ignorance on the frequency of punishment, 
presented in Table 1. A willfully ignorant dictator who chooses a1 and a payoff of 70 for himself 
is punished less often if the unfair allocation results (38 percent), compared to a dictator who 
reveals (53 percent) or to the baseline treatment (61 percent) (McNemar test, p=0.012, and 
   unfair (70-10) 
fair 
(50-50) 
dominant 
(70-50) 
dominated 
(50-10) 
Baseline Average Frequency 
19.72 
0.61 
0.56 
0.04 
1.76 
0.13 
12.41 
0.50 
      
Hidden Information – 
Revealed 
Average 
Frequency 
16.25 
0.53 
0.58 
0.05 
2.67 
0.13 
9.50 
0.37 
      
Hidden Information – 
Ignorant 
Average 
Frequency 
11.42 
0.38 
4.42 
0.20 
8.00 
0.27 
6.00 
0.28 
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Fischer exact test, p=0.024, respectively).10 Conversely, if the dominant allocation results, a 
willfully ignorant dictator is punished more frequently (27 percent versus 13 percent, in both 
cases) (McNemar test, p=0.039, and Fischer exact test, p=0.101, respectively). Similarly, a 
willfully ignorant dictator who chooses 50 for himself is punished more often if the fair 
allocation results and less often if the dominated allocation results, compared to a dictator who 
reveals or to the baseline treatment, though the difference is not significant in all cases 
(McNemar tests, p=0.012 and p=0.180, and Fisher exact tests, p=0.010 and p=0.021, 
respectively).11  
 
 
 
Figure 3: Individual Third Party’s Punishment Assignment for the Unfair and Dominant 
Allocation Depending on the Dictator’s Choice to either Reveal or Remain Ignorant. 
 
Results 1 and 2 are further illustrated in Figure 3. The figure shows the individual third 
parties’ punishment assignments in the hidden information treatment when either the unfair 
allocation (left panel) or the dominant allocation (right panel) are realized. Circles above (below) 
the 45-degree line indicate third parties who punished a dictator who first revealed more (less) 
than a willfully ignorant dictator. The numbers in the circles indicate the number of observations; 
circles without numbers represent one observation. For instance, when the unfair allocation 
realized, 27 third parties punished neither a willfully ignorant dictator nor a dictator who first 
10 Our results on the punishment level and frequency are confirmed by regression analyses that we conduct to 
complement the non-parametric tests. See Appendix A for the details.  
11 Consistent with our observation on levels of punishment, there is no difference in the frequency of punishment 
between the baseline and the hidden information treatments when the dictator reveals the payoff information (Fisher 
exact tests, p=0.451, p=1, p=1, p=0.186 for unfair, fair, dominant, and dominated, respectively). 
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revealed. Providing further support for the punishment pattern we observed earlier, of those third 
parties who did punish the unfair allocation, the majority assigned greater punishment to a 
dictator who first revealed than to a willfully ignorant dictator. The pattern is reversed when the 
dominant allocation realizes: the majority of those third parties who punished assigned more 
punishment to a willfully ignorant dictator than to a dictator who first revealed.  
 
3.2 Expected Payoffs of Dictators 
We now turn to the dictators’ expected payoffs for each possible allocation choice strategy. There 
are four choice strategies in the baseline treatment, based on the two possible realized states and 
the two possible actions in each state. Because there is no uncertainty, these strategies are 
identified by the resulting outcomes: {unfair, dominant}, {fair, dominant}, {unfair, dominated}, 
and {fair, dominated}. In the hidden information treatment, the dictator can choose to either 
reveal the payoff information – in which case the same four strategies as in the baseline become 
available – or to remain willfully ignorant, in which case the two unconditional action choices, a1 
or a2, are available. Table 2 shows the dictators’ average expected payoffs, based on the 
punishment behavior of third parties, for each of the possible strategies in a treatment. 
 
Table 2: Expected Payoffs of Dictators under Different Strategies 
 
Baseline 
Hidden Information 
 Reveal Ignorance 
{unfair, dominant}   (a1| ω1) (a1| ω2) 59.26 60.54  
{fair, dominant}       (a2| ω1) (a1| ω2) 58.84 58.38  
{unfair, dominated} (a1| ω1) (a2| ω2) 43.94 47.13  
{fair, dominated}     (a2| ω1) (a2| ω2) 43.52 44.96  
{unfair / dominant}  (a1) -  60.29 
{fair / dominated}    (a2) -  44.79 
 
Table 2 reveals, not surprisingly, that any strategy that pursues the dominated allocation 
in state ω2 yields lower expected payoffs than strategies pursuing the dominant allocation 
(Wilcoxon signed rank tests for all five comparisons, p<0.01).12 The three strategies that 
implement the dominated allocation yield similar expected payoffs.  
12 For each strategy, a distribution of payoffs is generated by the punishment behavior of the third parties, which we 
use as the basis of all tests in this subsection. 
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Our main interest is the effect of the dictator’s choice to remain ignorant on his expected 
payoff. We first compare the strategies that select the same allocations. In this regard, there is 
little difference between the expected payoffs of a dictator who chooses to remain ignorant and 
selects action a1 (60.29) and a dictator who reveals the payoff information, selects action a1 
regardless of the realized state (i.e., pursues the {unfair, dominant} allocations) and receives an 
expected payoff of 60.54 (Wilcoxon signed rank test, p=0.137). However, the difference in 
expected earnings of a willfully ignorant dictator who selects a1 and a dictator who chooses the 
same action unconditionally in the baseline is marginally significant (60.29 vs. 59.26; Wilcoxon 
rank-sum test, p=0.075).13  
We can also compare the strategy of remaining ignorant and selecting a1 to revealing and 
acting fairly by giving the receiver a payoff of 50, regardless of the state – i.e., implementing the 
fair or dominant allocations – in the hidden information treatment and to acting fairly in the 
baseline treatment.14 While the differences are small, the expected payoff of remaining ignorant 
and playing a1 (60.29) is significantly higher than the expected payoff of either of these two other 
strategies (58.38 and 58.84; Wilcoxon signed rank test, p<0.01, and Wilcoxon rank-sum test, 
p<0.01, respectively).  
The observation of very small payoff differences reflects our finding that willful 
ignorance has two countervailing effects on punishment, described in Results 1 and 2. When 
dictators forgo acquiring the payoff information and select action a1, they are punished less if an 
unfair allocation results but more if a dominant allocation results. Thus, while a strategy relying 
on willful ignorance provides some diversion of punishment when unfair outcomes result, such a 
strategy also yields more punishment when fortune produces a favorable outcome for the 
receiver. As a result, willful ignorance provides similar expected payoffs to acting with 
information about payoffs. 
 
3.3 Dictators’ Strategies and Resulting Allocations 
Finally, we consider the dictators’ information acquisition decisions in the treatment with hidden 
information, as well as their allocation choices in all treatments.  
13 Comparing the expected payoffs in the baseline and the hidden information treatment when the dictator reveals, 
we find no significant differences in any of the four strategies; Wilcoxon rank-sum tests, p>0.1). This is in line with 
the observation that there are no significant differences in the punishment pattern.  
14 As we will see (in Section 3.3), these are the most frequently chosen strategies. 
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In the baseline treatment, 33 percent of dictators (9 out of 27) chose the action a1 
regardless of the state, which corresponds to the allocations {unfair, dominant}. Almost twice as 
many, or 63 percent (17 out of 27), chose the strategy that gave the receiver a payoff of 50 in 
either stage – e.g., a2 in state ω1 and a1 in state ω2, or {fair, dominant}. One subject chose action 
a2 in state ω2, implementing {fair, dominated}. This overall pattern of behavior is in line with 
earlier results on dictator games with punishment.15 
In the hidden information treatment, 43 percent of the dictators (13 out of 30) remained 
ignorant about the consequences of their decision for the receiver. This percentage almost exactly 
matches the 44 percent of dictators who remained ignorant in Dana et al. (2007). All of the 
dictators who remained ignorant chose action a1 {unfair, dominant}. Of those dictators who 
revealed the state, 12 percent (2 out of 17) choose a1 unconditionally {unfair, dominant} and 88 
percent (15 out of 17) choose a2 in state ω1 and a1 in state ω2 {fair, dominant}. Dictators who 
revealed the state thus chose the fair allocation in state ω1 in the large majority of the cases. This 
shows that most dictators who reveal the state do so in order to be able to condition their 
allocation choice on the state of the world.  
The dictators’ strategies resulted in different frequencies of the possible allocations in the 
two treatments. In the baseline treatment, when state ω1 realized, 33 percent of dictators (9 out of 
27) chose the unfair allocation. The unfair allocation resulted with higher frequency (50 percent, 
or 15 of 30) in the hidden information treatment. In state ω2, the dominant allocation resulted 
with almost the same frequency in the hidden information treatment (30 out of 30 cases) and the 
baseline treatment (26 out of 27 cases).  
The fact that unfair allocations result more frequently under hidden information than in 
the baseline treatment resembles the findings in Dana et al. (2007). In their experiment the 
frequency of the unfair allocation increased from 26 to 63 percent. The interpretation of Dana, et 
al., is that the possibility to remain ignorant gives subjects the moral “wiggle room” to behave 
self-interestedly. While similar in direction, the effect in our experiment is much smaller and not 
statistically significant (Fisher exact test, p=0.284). Of course, a key difference between the two 
experiments is the presence of a punishment stage in our design. The threat of punishment alone 
potentially limits the extent to which subjects are willing to act as if willful ignorance absolves 
15 In Bartling and Fischbacher (2012), for instance, 63 percent of dictators selected a fair allocation in a binary 
dictator game with punishment that is comparable to our game if state ω1 prevails. 
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them of responsibility. As we see, third parties still hold dictators responsible for their 
ignorance.16  
 
4. Discussion of Behavioral Model Predictions 
In this paper, we ask the empirical question whether willful ignorance can reduce punishment for 
a dictator who implements an unfair allocation. Our goal was not to design an experiment in 
order to distinguish between different behavioral models of punishment and social preferences. 
However, it is nevertheless instructive to discuss the qualitative comparative-static predictions of 
some prominent models regarding the impact of the dictator’s choice to remain willfully ignorant 
on the punishment by the third party. Therefore, we now consider some of the leading models in 
the literature, and compare their qualitative predictions to the pattern of punishment behavior in 
our experiment. 
Note first that the canonical model of pure self-interest predicts that no subject in the role 
of a third party will punish because punishment is costly. This prediction is clearly inconsistent 
with the data. 
 
4.1 Outcome-Based Models of Social Preferences 
Outcome-based models of social preferences (Fehr and Schmidt 1999; Bolton and Ockenfels 
2000) assume that some people dislike payoff inequalities. Inequality-averse people might thus 
be willing to incur costs to reduce the payoff inequality – e.g., by punishing an unfair dictator. 
Importantly, these models are based on final monetary payoffs only and do not take into account 
how these allocations came about.  
In the spirit of these models, we assume that the third party cares about the payoff 
difference between the dictator and the receiver. Consistent with this model class, we observe 
higher levels and frequencies of punishment for allocations with higher inequality – even for 
willfully ignorant dictators (Result 3). The important observation for our purposes, however, is 
that for a given allocation, purely outcome-based social preferences models do not predict a 
difference based on how that allocation was produced. Therefore, punishment should be the 
16 Moreover, while in Dana, et al., subjects who remained willfully ignorant never found out about the consequences 
for the receiver, dictators in our experiment received a “punishment signal” about the realized state of the world, due 
to the fact that third parties punished differently when the unfair allocation resulted than when the result was the 
dominant allocation. Thus, dictators lose some of the benefit of remaining ignorance, due to the information 
conveyed by punishment. 
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same, for example, when the unfair allocation is realized, for dictators who remained ignorant in 
the hidden information treatment, who revealed the state in the hidden information treatment, or 
who made choices in the baseline treatment. The data (Results 1 and 2) do not support this 
prediction. 
 
4.2 Intention-Based Models of Social Preferences 
A second class of social preference models focuses on the intentions behind an action (Rabin 
1993; Dufwenberg and Kirchsteiger 2004; Seebald 2010). These models assume that people are 
willing to incur costs to punish unkind actions and to reward kind actions. The main difference 
with purely outcome-based models is that players respond to the perceived kindness of other 
players and not to the inequality of the resulting outcomes. The kindness of a player is measured 
as the distance from an “equitable” payoff, which is defined as the average between the highest 
and the lowest efficient payoff that a player can grant another player. The action of a player is 
perceived as kind (unkind) if he gives more (less) than the “equitable” payoff. Sebald (2010) 
extends the dynamic framework of Dufwenberg and Kirchsteiger (2004) to allow for games in 
which monetary payoffs also depend on chance. In this model, remaining ignorant can be 
interpreted as choosing a lottery over the receiver’s payoff. We assume that the dictator’s 
behavior towards the receiver determines the third party’s assessment of the dictator’s kindness, 
and that the third party derives utility from reciprocating the (un)kindness of the dictator.  
Consider first the dictator’s choice of the unfair allocation (70-10) in state ω1 in the 
baseline treatment or after revealing in the hidden information treatment. The implementation of 
the unfair allocation is evaluated as unkind because it leaves the receiver with less than the 
equitable payoff of 30 (the average of the receiver’s highest and lowest possible payoff of 50 and 
10, respectively). Second, the implementation of the fair allocation (50-50) in state ω1 in the 
baseline treatment or after revealing in the hidden information treatment is evaluated as kind 
because it leaves the receiver with more than the equitable payoff of 30. Finally, remaining 
willfully ignorant leads to the lottery 0.5 ∘ 50 + 0.5 ∘ 10 over the receiver’s payoff, regardless of 
whether the dictator chooses a1 or a2. Since the expected payoff of this lottery equals the 
equitable payoff of 30, remaining ignorant is evaluated as neither kind nor unkind.  
Thus, if a third party reciprocates a dictator’s unkindness with punishment, these models 
correctly predict Results 1 and 2; i.e., more (less) punishment for a dictator who implements an 
unfair (fair) allocation after revealing the state, relative to a dictator who remained willfully 
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ignorant.17 The same prediction pattern prevails in state ω2, where this class of models correctly 
predicts why a dictator who revealed the state is punished more (less) when the dominated 
(dominant) allocation results, compared to a dictator who remained willfully ignorant.18  
However, intention-based theories cannot explain why a willfully ignorant dictator is 
punished differently depending on which state results (Result 3). After the decision to remain 
ignorant, the final allocation does not influence the third party’s evaluation of the dictator’s 
kindness and should thus not affect the punishment decision. 
 
4.3 Hybrid Models of Outcome- and Intention-Based Social Preferences  
Two factors determine the kindness of an action in Falk and Fischbacher’s (2006) theory of 
reciprocity. First, the kindness of a player – such as the dictator – is determined by the expected 
payoff inequality, where the expectation is taken at the dictator’s decision node. Second, it is 
decisive whether an action is intentional or not, which depends on the dictator’s choice options. 
The dictator is considered as unkind (kind) if he implements an allocation that favors him (the 
receiver) in expectation, and he is considered as even more unkind (kind) if his choice is 
intentional. We assume that the dictator’s choice options and the expected payoff difference 
between dictator and receiver determine the third party’s evaluation of the dictator’s kindness, 
and that the third party derives utility from reciprocating the (un)kindness of the dictator.  
Consider first the dictator’s choice of the unfair allocation (70-10) in state ω1 in the 
baseline treatment or after revealing in the hidden information treatment. The implementation of 
the unfair allocation is intentional because the fair allocation (50-50) could have been chosen, 
and a (expected) payoff difference of 60 results. Remaining ignorant grants the recipient an 
expected payoff of 30. Again, the fair allocation could have been chosen (after revealing) and, 
hence, the action is intentional. In both cases, therefore, the dictator’s action is intentional but the 
expected payoff difference is lower in case of a willfully ignorant dictator. The model thus makes 
the correct qualitative comparative-static prediction that a willfully ignorant dictator is punished 
less if the unfair allocation is implemented compared to a dictator who reveals the state or a 
dictator in the baseline treatment (Result 1). 
17 Note however, that, given the choice options of the third party, the model predicts positive punishment only for the 
implementation of an unkind act and no punishment for the implementation of a neutral or kind act. This is because 
the third party cannot reciprocate a kind act by the dictator with a reward. 
18 The choice of the dominated allocation in the baseline treatment or after revealing in the hidden information 
treatment is unkind, while the choice of the dominant allocation is kind. A willfully ignorant dictator, again, is 
neither kind nor unkind.  
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Consider now the dictator’s choice of the fair allocation (50-50) in state ω1 in the baseline 
treatment or after revealing in the hidden information treatment. Since an equitable payoff is 
implemented, the dictator’s action is not perceived as unkind and the prediction is no punishment. 
If the dictator remained ignorant, however, the expected payoff difference is 20. Moreover, the 
action is also intentional because the dictator could have revealed the state and chosen (50-50). It 
follows that the qualitative comparative-static prediction of the model is also in line with the 
second effect of willful ignorance on the punishment pattern, namely that a willfully ignorant 
dictator is punished more if the fair allocation results (Result 2). The same prediction pattern 
prevails in state ω2.19 
Again, while this model correctly predicts our first two main results, it cannot explain 
why a willfully ignorant dictator is punished differently depending on which state results (Result 
3), because the dictator’s kindness is evaluated at his decision node and not after the revelation of 
uncertainty. As was the case in purely intention-based models, the third party’s punishment 
decision should thus not be influenced by the resulting state.  
 
4.4 Models of procedural fairness 
Models of procedural fairness assume people do not only care about outcomes but also about the 
procedures that lead to these outcomes (Frey, Benz, and Stutzer 2004; Bolton et al. 2005; 
Trautmann 2009; Krawczyk 2011; Fudenberg and Levine 2012; Brock et al. 2013; Cappelen et 
al., 2013). An important example of such a procedure is the notion of “equal opportunities.” One 
interpretation of this notion is that not only ex post realized payoff distributions are important but 
also ex ante expected payoff distributions. Brock et al. (2013), for example, extend the Fehr and 
Schmidt (1999) model to allow for a convex combination of ex ante and ex post payoff 
comparisons. Without uncertainty, ex ante and ex post fairness coincide, but with uncertainty a 
player’s fairness evaluations depend on the weight that he places on ex ante and ex post payoff 
19 If the dominated allocation (50-10) is chosen, the choice is intentional in all cases because the dominant allocation 
was available. Since the (expected) payoff difference is higher in case of a dictator in the baseline treatment or after 
revealing in the hidden information treatment, the model correctly predicts lower punishment for a willfully ignorant 
dictator. If the dominant allocation (70-50) is chosen in the baseline treatment or after revealing in the hidden 
information treatment, first, the (expected) payoff difference is 20 and, second, the choice is not intentional because 
the only alternative gives the receiver an even lower payoff. If the dominant allocation however results after 
remaining ignorant, there are two differences. First, the expected payoff difference is higher (40). Second, the choice 
is even intentional because the dictator could have revealed the state and chosen an allocation that gives the receiver 
a payoff of 50 and not only the expected payoff of 30. Hence, the model again correctly predicts higher punishment 
for a willfully ignorant dictator. 
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differences. We assume that the third party cares about the payoff difference between the dictator 
and the receiver and, for simplicity, we also initially assume that the third party places weight 
only on ex ante payoff differences.  
If the unfair allocation (70-10) results in state ω1 in the baseline treatment or after 
revealing in the hidden information treatment, the (ex ante) payoff difference is 60. Since the ex 
ante payoff difference in case of a willfully ignorant dictator who chose a1 is only 40, the model 
makes the correct qualitative comparative-static prediction that a willfully ignorant dictator is 
punished less (Result 1). If the fair allocation (50-50) results in state ω1 in the baseline treatment 
or after revealing in the hidden information treatment, the (ex ante) payoff difference is zero. 
Since the ex ante payoff difference is 20 in case of a willfully ignorant dictator who chose a2, the 
model again makes the correct qualitative comparative-static prediction that a willfully ignorant 
dictator is punished more (Result 2). The same qualitative prediction pattern prevails in state ω2.  
A simple model that places sufficient weight on the ex ante payoff differences is thus able 
to qualitatively predict the comparative-static effect of the dictator’s choice to either remain 
ignorant or to reveal the state of the world on the assigned punishment. If the model additionally 
places some weight on ex post payoff differences, it also correctly predicts that a willfully 
ignorant dictator who chose a1 (a2) is punished more if the unfair (dominated) allocation results 
than if the dominant (fair) allocation results (Result 3).  
 
5. Conclusion 
This paper studies costly third-party punishment. Consistent with prior research, we find that 
individuals who observe others behaving unfairly often incur personal costs to punish such 
unfairness. 
 Our focus in this study is on how the opportunity to remain willfully ignorant – by 
avoiding information on the consequences of one’s actions for others – affects the extent to which 
individuals are held accountable and punished by third parties for the consequences of their 
actions. Discussions of responsibility in political and corporate scandals are often accompanied 
by claims of ignorance that could have been resolved if the involved parties had sought out the 
relevant information. It is important, therefore, to understand whether such strategies are effective 
for deflecting blame and punishment. 
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 Our evidence in this regard reveals an interesting pattern. When bad consequences result 
– i.e., unfair or dominated allocations – a decision maker is punished less when he chose not to 
know the consequences of his actions than when he either first chose to find out or was informed 
by default. Thus, when decision makers would be blamed or punished for something bad 
happening, they can avoid some of this blame or punishment through (the perception of) 
ignorance, even when deliberately chosen.  
On the other hand, we also observe that the act of remaining willfully ignorant is, itself, 
punished. That is, when good outcomes result following a decision maker’s choice to remain 
ignorant – i.e., fair or dominant allocations – a decision maker is nevertheless punished to some 
extent. Thus, while willful ignorance may be effective for deflecting blame when negative 
consequences are likely, awareness that one is using willful ignorance as part of a strategy is 
perceived negatively and inherently punishable. 
 In short, by remaining willfully ignorant, decision makers deflect some punishment when 
bad consequences arise, due to the fact that something good could have happened. Conversely, 
when good outcomes result from decisions made under willful ignorance, the fact that less 
desirable outcomes could have obtained provides grounds for punishment. Nevertheless, even 
under willful ignorance, punishment is still higher when bad consequences arise than when good 
outcomes result. Such punishment behavior by third parties is consistent with simple behavioral 
social preference models that combine ex ante and ex post fairness concerns (Brock et al. 2013; 
Cappelen et al. 2013).  
 For dictators in our experiment, willful ignorance is not a better strategy in expectation 
than acquiring payoff information. This is mainly because the third parties punish willful 
ignorance even when fortune produces a favorable outcome for the recipient.  
However, this punishment pattern may have very different consequences outside the 
laboratory. Since outside the lab attention to the possibility of punishing someone is often salient 
only when bad outcomes arise, the fact that decision makers receive lighter sanctions when 
willfully ignorant suggests this may be a good strategy in contexts where punishment is unlikely 
to be considered absent some noticeably bad consequence. Thus, for example, the symmetry of 
punishment possibilities in our experiment may be an important factor not present in natural 
contexts, where punishment may be considered only in cases where bad outcomes have indeed 
been produced. In such situations, our results suggest that, indeed, willful ignorance may 
circumvent blame and punishment. 
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Appendix A 
Table A-1 reports the results of regression analyses to complement the non-parametric tests 
reported in the paper.  
Column (1) shows an OLS regression of the punishment level on dummy variables of the 
dictator’s decisions in the different treatments. Columns (2) and (3) report probit and logit 
regressions, respectively, of the punishment frequency on the same set of dummy variables. The 
omitted category in all regressions is the choice of the fair allocation in the baseline treatment. 
The first three dummy variables measure the difference between the omitted category 
(fair) and the three other possible allocations in the baseline treatment. The unfair allocation is 
punished significantly more and more often than the fair allocation. (We also see that the 
dominated allocation is punished significantly more and more often, while the difference to the 
dominant allocation is small and partly insignificant.)  
The next four dummy variables measure the difference between the baseline and the 
hidden information treatment when the dictator reveals the state. In all three regressions, none of 
the four coefficients is significant, which confirms our previous finding that the punishment 
pattern for a dictator who reveals is the same as the pattern in the baseline treatment.  
Finally, the last four dummy variables measure the difference in punishment for a given 
allocation between a dictator who reveals and a dictator who remains ignorant in the hidden 
information treatment. All of the four comparisons in each of the three regression models show a 
significant difference of the previously reported sign, which again confirms the results of the non-
parametric tests. 
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Table A-1: Regression Analyses 
  (1) OLS 
(2) 
Probit 
(3) 
Logit 
unfair (70-10) 19.17*** 2.068*** 3.710*** 
  (2.916) (0.339) (0.734) 
dominant (70-50) 1.204 0.658** 1.354** 
  (0.784) (0.280) (0.625) 
dominated (50-10) 11.85*** 1.786*** 3.258*** 
  (2.064) (0.331) (0.722) 
HI × unfair (70-10) -3.472 -0.199 -0.318 
  (3.926) (0.238) (0.382) 
HI × dominant (70-50) 0.907 0.017 0.032 
  (1.285) (0.299) (0.558) 
HI × dominated (50-10) -2.907 -0.341 -0.547 
  (2.831) (0.239) (0.384) 
HI × fair (50-50) 0.0278 0.141 0.314 
  (0.605) (0.420) (0.937) 
HI × ignorant × unfair (70-10) -4.833*** -0.380*** -0.609*** 
  (1.257) (0.133) (0.214) 
HI × ignorant × dominant (70-50) 5.333** 0.488** 0.860** 
  (2.097) (0.204) (0.368) 
HI × ignorant × dominated (50-10) -3.500*** -0.232* -0.381* 
  (1.292) (0.137) (0.226) 
HI × ignorant × fair (50-50) 3.833*** 0.803*** 1.558*** 
  (1.383) (0.287) (0.597) 
Constant 0.556 -1.786*** -3.258*** 
  (0.472) (0.319) (0.724) 
# observations 696 696 696 
R-squared / Pseudo R-squared 0.156 0.142 0.142 
Notes: The dependent variable in regression (1) is assigned punishment points by the third party. The 
dependent variable in regressions (2) and (3) is a dummy that equals 1 if the third party punishes. The 
omitted category in all regressions is the choice of the fair allocation in the baseline treatment. “HI” 
indicates the hidden information treatment. Robust standard errors clustering at the subject level are 
reported in parentheses. *** denotes significance at 1 percent, ** at 5 percent, and * at 10 percent. 
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Appendix B 
B.1 Instructions for the dictators 
We are pleased to welcome you to this economic study. 
If you read the following instructions carefully, you can – depending on your decisions and/or 
those of the other participants – earn money in addition to the 15 Swiss francs that you receive as 
an initial endowment for participating. It is thus very important that you read the instructions 
carefully. If you have any questions, please contact us.  
During the study, speaking with the other participants in the study is forbidden. Violation of 
this rule will lead to exclusion from the study and all of the associated payments. 
During the study, we will not speak of francs, but of points. Your entire income will thus first be 
calculated in points. The points you earn during the study will be converted to Swiss francs at the 
end of the study. The following conversion rate applies: 
2 points = 1 Swiss franc. 
At the end of today’s study, you will receive the number of points earned during the study plus 
the initial endowment of 15 Swiss francs for appearing in cash. 
We will explain the exact procedure of the study on the next pages. For the sake of simplicity, we 
will always use male forms; we obviously include female participants in any case. 
The study 
At the beginning of the study, you will be randomly paired with two other persons who are 
also participating in the study. You will neither learn during nor after the study of the identities 
of the two persons you are paired with. In the same way, the two other persons will never learn of 
your identity. 
There are three types of participant in this study: participants A, B, and C. You are a participant 
A. The participants you are paired with are a participant B and a participant C. 
This study lasts for one round. You thus only make your decisions one single time. 
As participant A, you can decide how many points will be credited to you and to participant 
B. 
In doing this, you can choose between two possibilities: You will always get 70 points for 
possibility 1 and always 50 points for possibility 2. 
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The points for participant B, however, depend on which situation you are in. 
There are two possible situations: 
• In situation 1, participant B receives 10 points for possibility 1 and 50 points for 
possibility 2. 
• In situation 2, the payments are exactly opposite: participant B receives 50 points for 
possibility 1 and 10 points for possibility 2. 
The table below gives you a summary of your selection possibilities and the points resulting in 
both situations. Please note that the points you receive are identical in both situations. Only the 
points for participant B are reversed. 
 Situation 1  Situation 2 
 
 
Points for 
participant A 
Points for 
participant B 
 Points for 
participant A 
Points for 
participant B 
Possibility 1 70 10  70 50 
Possibility 2 50 50  50 10 
 
It will be randomly determined at the beginning of the study whether situation 1 or 
situation 2 is relevant. This information will not be automatically notified to you, however. 
Your own payment is identical in situations 1 and 2. You can thus opt for possibility 1 or 2 
without knowing or without later learning which situation is relevant. 
However, you can expose the situation, and after doing this decide between possibility 1 and 
possibility 2. 
If you do not expose the situation, you will not know which situation is relevant at the time of 
your decision between possibility 1 and 2, and you will never learn of this. You will also never 
learn which payment participant B received. 
 
You thus make two decisions in this study:  
1. You decide whether or not you want to expose which situation is relevant.  
2. You decide between possibility 1 and possibility 2.  
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If you decide to expose the situation, we ask you to select a possibility for both of the possible 
situations. You can therefore – if you expose the situation – make your decision dependent on 
the actual situation. You will first learn which situation is actually relevant after you have made 
your decision for both possible situations. It is thus very important – if you expose the situation – 
that you consider your decisions in both situations very seriously.  
Example 1: Participant A decides not to expose which situation is relevant. Afterwards, he opts 
for possibility 1. Participant A knows that he will receive 70 points, but he will never learn how 
many points participant B receives. He only knows that participant B will either receive 10 or 50 
points, each with a probability of 50%. 
Example 2: Participant A decides to expose which situation is relevant. He decides that he will 
select possibility 2 in situation 1 and possibility 1 in situation 2. He then learns that situation 2 
applies. His decision in situation 2 will thus be implemented. Participant A knows that he will 
earn 70 points and that participant B will receive 50 points. 
Participant B cannot make any decisions on his own in this study. 
Participant C has an initial endowment of 50 points. He observes 
(i) whether you expose the situation or not; 
(ii) which situation is relevant (even if you do not expose the situation); 
(iii) and which possibility you select in the relevant situation.  
Participant C has the opportunity to deduct points from you. Participant C can determine the 
point deduction in units of 5. He can thus deduct 0, 5, 10, 15, etc. points. 
A deduction of a unit of 5 points costs participant C one point. If, for example, participant C 
deducts 15 points from you, his own payment will be reduced by 3 points. 
Participant C can only deduct a maximum number points that will reduce your payment to 10 
points. Participant C can also decide not to deduct any points from you. 
 
Example 3: Participant C observes (i) that you expose the situation; (ii) that situation 2 is 
relevant; and (iii) that you selected possibility 1. He decides to deduct 10 points from you. The 
following payments thus result: 
Points for participant A Points for participant B Points for participant C 
70 – 10 = 60 50 50 – 2 = 48 
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Example 4: Participant C observes (i) that you do not expose the situation. (ii) Unlike you, he 
observes that situation 1 is relevant, and (iii) that you selected possibility 1. He decides not to 
lose any points and thus not to deduct points from you. The following payments thus result: 
Points for participant A Points for participant B Points for participant C 
70  10 50  
 
Please take enough time to become familiar with the decision possibilities. It is very important 
that you understand the decision possibilities exactly, as you can only make the two decisions 
“expose or not expose” and “possibility 1 or 2” once, and that the study concludes after this. 
Procedure on the computer: 
You make your decision as participant A on the screen shown below. You see your payment in 
case of possibility 1 and 2. However, you do not see the payment that results for participant B. 
 
If you want to select possibility 1 or 2 without exposing the situation in advance, then please 
click on the corresponding box for possibility 1 or 2. In order to confirm your decision, you must 
also click on the enter button at the bottom right-hand side. You can change your decision until 
you click this button. 
If you want to first expose the situation, you must click on the button “Expose situation”. If you 
decide to expose the situation, the screen below appears. You see the both possibilities in 
situation 1 on the left side of the screen and both possibilities in situation 2 on the right side of 
the screen. 
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You make your decision between the two possibilities by clicking the corresponding box in each 
of the situations. You will not learn which of the two situations is relevant for the payment until 
you have made your decisions for both situations. 
Once you have made your decisions for both situations, click on the enter button at the lower 
right hand side. You can change your decision until you click this button. 
At the end of the study, the number of points you earn will be converted to Swiss francs 
and, together with the initial endowment, paid out in cash to you. 
Do you have any questions? If yes, please raise your hand. We will then come to you at your 
workplace. If everything is clear, we kindly ask you to answer the control questions on the 
following pages.  
Control questions 
Please answer the following control questions. They only have the purpose of making you more 
familiar with the study. Your answers do not influence your payment at the end of the study. 
1. Participant A does not expose the situation and selects possibility 1. How many points does 
participant A receive, and how many does participant B receive with a probability of 50% 
each? 
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2. Participant A does not expose the situation and selects possibility 2. How many points does 
participant A receive, and how many does participant B receive with a probability of 50% 
each? 
3. Participant A exposes the situation. Situation 1 is relevant, and participant A selected 
possibility 2 in situation 1. How many points to participant A and participant B receive in 
this case? 
4. Participant A exposes the situation. Situation 2 is relevant, and participant A selected 
possibility 1 in situation 2. How many points to participant A and participant B receive in 
this case? 
5. Participant A does not expose the situation and selects possibility 2. Participant C learns 
that situation 2 is relevant. What is the maximum number of points that participant C can 
deduct from participant A? 
6. Participant A exposes the situation. Situation 1 is relevant, and participant A selected 
possibility 1 in situation 1. What is the maximum number of points that participant C can 
deduct from participant A? 
7. Participant A does not expose the situation and selects possibility 2. Participant C learns 
that situation 2 is relevant. In this case, participant C does not deduct any points from 
participant A. Please determine the final payments for participants A, B, and C. 
Points for participant A Points for participant B Points for participant C 
   
8. Participant A exposes the situation. Situation 1 is relevant, and participant A selected 
possibility 1 in situation 1. Participant C deducts 30 points from participant A. Please 
determine the final payments for participants A, B, and C. 
Points for participant A Points for participant B Points for participant C 
   
9. Participant A exposes the situation. Situation 2 is relevant, and participant A selected 
possibility 1 in situation 2. Participant C deducts 60 points from participant A. Please 
determine the final payments for participants A, B, and C. 
Points for participant A Points for participant B Points for participant C 
   
Please raise your hand when you have solved all the questions. We will then come to your 
workplace and check your answers. 
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B.2 Instructions for the receivers / third parties 
We are pleased to welcome you to this economic study. 
If you read the following instructions carefully, you can – depending on your decisions and/or 
those of the other participants – earn money in addition to the 15 Swiss francs that you receive as 
an initial endowment for participating. It is thus very important that you read the instructions 
carefully. If you have any questions, please contact us.  
During the study, speaking with the other participants in the study is forbidden. Violation of 
this rule will lead to exclusion from the study and all of the associated payments. 
During the study, we will not speak of francs, but of points. Your entire income will thus first be 
calculated in points. The points you earn during the study will be converted to Swiss francs at the 
end of the study. The following conversion rate applies: 
2 points = 1 Swiss franc. 
At the end of today’s study, you will receive the number of points earned during the study plus 
the initial endowment of 15 Swiss francs for appearing in cash. 
We will explain the exact procedure of the study on the next pages. For the sake of simplicity, we 
will always use male forms; we obviously include female participants in any case. 
The study 
At the beginning of the study, you will be randomly paired with two other persons who are 
also participating in the study. You will neither learn during nor after the study of the identities 
of the two persons you are paired with. In the same way, the two other persons will never learn of 
your identity. 
There are three types of participant in this study: participants A, B, and C. You are either a 
participant B or a participant C. You will not learn until the end of the study whether you are a 
participant B or a participant C. 
Each group consists of one participant A, B, and C each. If you are a participant B, you will thus 
be paired with a participant A and a participant C. If, however, you are a participant C, you will 
thus be paired with a participant A and a participant B. 
This study lasts for one round. You thus only make your decisions one single time. 
Participant A can decide how many points will be credited to himself and to participant B. 
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In doing this, Participant A chooses between two possibilities: He will always get 70 points for 
possibility 1 and always 50 points for possibility 2. 
The points for participant B, however, depend on which situation Participant A is in. 
There are two possible situations: 
• In situation 1, participant B receives 10 points for possibility 1 and 50 points for 
possibility 2. 
• In situation 2, the payments are exactly opposite: participant B receives 50 points for 
possibility 1 and 10 points for possibility 2. 
The table below gives you a summary of participant A’s selection possibilities and the points 
resulting in both situations. Please note that the points participant A receives are identical in both 
situations. Only the points for participant B are reversed. 
 Situation 1  Situation 2 
 
 
Points for 
participant A 
Points for 
participant B 
 Points for 
participant A 
Points for 
participant B 
Possibility 1 70 10  70 50 
Possibility 2 50 50  50 10 
 
It will be randomly determined at the beginning of the study whether situation 1 or 
situation 2 is relevant. This information will not be automatically notified to participant A, 
however. 
Participant A’s payment is identical in situations 1 and 2. He can thus opt for possibility 1 or 2 
without knowing or without later learning which situation is relevant. 
However, participant A can expose the situation, and after doing this decide between possibility 1 
and possibility 2. 
If participant A does not expose the situation, he will not know which situation is relevant at the 
time of his decision between possibility 1 and 2, and he will never learn of this. Participant A 
will also never learn which payment participant B received. 
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Participant A thus makes two decisions in this study:  
1. He decides whether or not he wants to expose which situation is relevant.  
2. He decides between possibility 1 and possibility 2.  
Example 1: Participant A decides not to expose which situation is relevant. Afterwards, he opts 
for possibility 1. Participant A knows that he will receive 70 points, but he will never learn how 
many points participant B receives. He only knows that participant B will either receive 10 or 50 
points, each with a probability of 50%. 
Example 2: Participant A decides to expose which situation is relevant. Situation 2 is relevant, 
and participant A selects possibility 1. Participant A knows that he will earn 70 points and that 
participant B will receive 50 points. 
Participant B cannot make any decisions on his own in this study. 
Participant C has an initial endowment of 50 points.  
Participant C has the opportunity to deduct points from participant A. Participant C can 
determine the point deduction in units of 5. He can thus deduct 0, 5, 10, 15, etc. points. 
A deduction of a unit of 5 points costs participant C one point. If, for example, participant C 
deducts 15 points from participant A, his own payment will be reduced by 3 points. 
Participant C can only deduct a maximum number points from participant A that will reduce the 
latter’s payment to 10 points. Participant C can also decide not to deduct any points from 
participant A. 
Participant A makes his decisions without knowing whether participant C will deduct 
points from him or not. Participant A only learns of this at the end of the study. 
As you do not yet know whether you are a participant B or a participant C, we ask you to 
indicate which decision you would make as participant C. If you are actually a participant C, 
your decision will be implemented. 
Before you observe 
(iv) whether participant A exposes the situation or not; 
(v) which situation is relevant (even if participant A does not expose the situation); 
(vi) and which possibility participant A selects in the relevant situation;  
 
we ask you to indicate how many points you would deduct from participant A in each possible 
case in case you are a participant C. 
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There are eight possible cases: 
• Four cases result when participant A exposes the situation. Situation 1 or situation 2 can then 
be relevant. In each situation, participant A can decide between possibility 1 and possibility 2 
Participant A exposes the situation: 
Situation 1 is relevant  Situation 2 is relevant 
Case: Participant A 
selects possibility 1  
How many 
points would 
you deduct? 
 
Case: Participant A 
selects possibility 1  
How many 
points would 
you deduct? 
Case: Participant A 
selects possibility 2  
How many 
points would 
you deduct? 
 
Case: Participant A 
selects possibility 2  
How many 
points would 
you deduct? 
• Four cases result when participant A does not expose the situation. Participant A decides 
between possibility 1 and 2 without knowing which situation is relevant. As you – unlike 
participant A – know which situation is relevant, you can make your point deduction 
dependent on the relevant situation. 
Participant A does not expose the situation and thus does not know which situation is 
relevant: 
Situation 1 is relevant  Situation 2 is relevant 
Case: Participant A 
selects possibility 
1 without knowing how 
this affects participant 
B 
How many 
points would 
you deduct? 
 
Case: Participant A 
selects possibility 
1 without knowing how 
this affects participant 
B 
How many 
points would 
you deduct? 
Case: Participant A 
selects possibility 
2 without knowing how 
this affects participant 
B 
How many 
points would 
you deduct? 
 
Case: Participant A 
selects possibility 
2 without knowing how 
this affects participant 
B 
How many 
points would 
you deduct? 
You will first learn whether you are a participant B or a participant C after you have made your 
decision in all eight cases. You will also then learn (i) whether participant A exposes the 
situation, (ii) which situation is relevant, and (iii) which possibility participant A selects. Each of 
your eight decisions can thus determine your payment.  
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Example 3: You learn that you are a participant C and you observe (i) that participant A exposes 
the situation; (ii) that situation 2 is relevant; and (iii) that he selected possibility 1. In this case, 
you decided to deduct 10 points from participant A. The following payments thus result: 
Points for participant A Points for participant B Points for participant C 
70 – 10 = 60 50 50 – 2 = 48 
 
Example 4: You learn that you are a participant B, and you observe (i) that participant A does not 
expose the situation. (ii) Unlike participant A, you observe that situation 1 is relevant, and (iii) 
that participant A selected possibility 1. The participant C assigned to you decides not to lose any 
points and thus not to deduct points from participant A. The following payments thus result: 
Points for participant A Points for participant B Points for participant C 
70  10 50  
 
Please take enough time to become familiar with the decision possibilities. It is very important 
that you understand the decision possibilities exactly, as you can only make a decision about 
point deductions in the eight possible cases once, and that the study concludes after this. 
 
Procedure on the computer: 
You enter your decisions on the screen below. In the upper part of the screen, you see whether 
the shown cases are those where participant A has exposed the situation or not. Here you see the 
screen for the case where participant A has exposed the situation. 
You enter your reaction in situation 1 on the left side of the screen, and you enter your reaction to 
situation 2 on the right side of the screen. Please enter in both situations how you would react if 
you were participant C to possible decisions by participant A.  
You enter the desired point deduction by clicking on the corresponding field. The field at the very 
left corresponds to a point deduction of 0, and that at the very right to a point deduction of 60. 
Any unit of five between these numbers is also possible. The point deduction will always appear 
to the right, next to “Your chosen point deduction”. 
The screen below shows a randomly selected example; participant C deducts 10 points if 
participant A selects possibility 1 in situation 1 and 20 points if he selects possibility 2. 
Participant C has not yet made a decision for situation 2. 
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 After you have selected your deduction points for all four possibilities, please click on the 
“confirm” button. You can change your decision until you click this button. 
The screen for the case where participant A does not expose the situation is very similar. Here 
you see an example:  
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The order in which the screens appear is random. Please take exact note therefore of the case 
for which you make your decisions! 
At the end of the study, the number of points you earn will be converted to Swiss francs 
and, together with the initial endowment, paid out in cash to you. 
Do you have any questions? If yes, please raise your hand. We will then come to you at your 
workplace. If everything is clear, we kindly ask you to answer the control questions on the 
following pages.  
Control questions 
Please answer the following control questions. They only have the purpose of making you more 
familiar with the study. Your answers do not influence your payment at the end of the study. 
1. Participant A does not expose the situation and selects possibility 1. How many points does 
participant A receive, and how many does participant B receive with a probability of 50% 
each? 
2. Participant A does not expose the situation and selects possibility 2. How many points does 
participant A receive, and how many does participant B receive with a probability of 50% 
each? 
3. Participant A exposes the situation. Situation 1 is relevant, and participant A selected 
possibility 2 in situation 1. How many points to participant A and participant B receive in 
this case? 
4. Participant A exposes the situation. Situation 2 is relevant, and participant A selected 
possibility 1 in situation 2. How many points to participant A and participant B receive in 
this case? 
5. Participant A does not expose the situation and selects possibility 2. Participant C learns 
that situation 2 is relevant. What is the maximum number of points that participant C can 
deduct from participant A? 
6. Participant A exposes the situation. Situation 1 is relevant, and he selected possibility 1 in 
situation 1. What is the maximum number of points that participant C can deduct from 
participant A? 
7. Participant A does not expose the situation and selects possibility 2. Participant C learns 
that situation 2 is relevant. In this case, participant C does not deduct any points from 
participant A. Please determine the final payments for participants A, B, and C. 
Points for participant A Points for participant B Points for participant C 
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8. Participant A exposes the situation and learns that situation 1 is relevant. He selects 
possibility 1. Participant C deducts 30 points from participant A in this case. Please 
determine the final payments for participants A, B, and C. 
Points for participant A Points for participant B Points for participant C 
   
9. Participant A exposes the situation and learns that situation 2 is relevant. He selects 
possibility 1. Participant C deducts 60 points from participant A in this case. Please 
determine the final payments for participants A, B, and C 
Points for participant A Points for participant B Points for participant C 
   
Please raise your hand when you have solved all the questions. We will then come to your 
workplace and check your answers. 
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